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HIDING SEXUAL HARASSMENT: MYTHS 
AND REALITIES 
By Pat K. Chew* 
The percent of Americans viewing sexual harassment as a major problem 
actually decreased between 2017 and 2019, with only 53% of men considering it 
a major problem in 2019 compared to 66% in 2017.1 
“Each time that I was taking it, again and again, it just felt like more of me 
diminishing . . . until [I] was just like a shell of a person.”2 
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Sexual harassment and gender disparities in the workplace continue, but 
we are not paying enough attention.3 The heralded me-too movement and the 
publicized downfalls of Harvey Weinstein, Bill Cosby, and other former lumi-
naries4 might give the impression that the lid is blown off the indignities of har-
assment in the workplace and that American society’s collective disdain and 
abhorrence of harassment has quickly put an end to these incivilities. But these 
headline cases are just the tip of the sexual harassment iceberg; they may even 
give us a false sense of security and optimism. 
The truth is that we are not yet in that post-harassment, post-sexist era. By 
not candidly recognizing that and taking affirmative corrective measures, we 
are letting harassers and their employers get away with harassment and contin-
ue to hurt women in the workplace. 
 
3  I am aware and recognize that “sex discrimination” and “sexual harassment” have been 
defined in very specific ways under Title VII caselaw. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786–92 
(1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751–54 (1998). I am using the terms 
“sex discrimination” and “sexual harassment” in this Article, however, in a more interdisci-
plinary and plain-language way to encompass women being perceived and treated differently 
and disadvantageously in the workplace because of their sex and gender. These disparate 
attitudes and treatment may be revealed in the form of specific employment decisions (as in 
hiring and promotion) but also may occur in day-to-day experiences. See, e.g., RACHEL 
THOMAS ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE 2019, at 11 (2019) [hereinaf-
ter MCKINSEY REPORT 2019]. Later in the Article, for instance, I explain how the legal defi-
nition of sexual harassment has been too narrow and consequently ineffective in addressing 
sexual harassment in reality. See infra text accompanying notes 189-193. 
4  See, e.g., Orion Rummler, Global #MeToo Movement Resulted in 7 Convictions, 5 Charg-
es of Influential Figures, AXIOS (July 3, 2020), https://www.axios.com/global-metoo-
movement-convictions-charges-382ff226-7ad3-4b26-ac89-451788192578.html [perma.cc/F 
M66-YJKV]. 
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This Article explores three related myths on which sexual harassment is 
built and allowed to continue. These myths perpetuate what we would like to 
believe about sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and what happens to 
women who complain about sexual harassment and their alleged harassers. Part 
I discusses the myth that gender inequality and sex discrimination are no longer 
prevalent. It continues by exploring the stories we tell ourselves and others to 
keep that myth alive. Part II discusses the myth that sexual harassment is no 
longer prevalent. It continues by revealing that sexual harassment very much 
continues and that it is intrinsically related to sex discrimination. Part III ex-
plores the myth that there is a just resolution for the courageous women who 
are harassed and then report it—that the men and employers responsible are 
identified and punished. This Article reveals instead that harassed employees 
are disadvantaged at every stage of the reporting and resolution process, often 
leading to their frustration and failure. 
This Article hopes to inspire conversation on these three myths and their 
contrary realities. By recognizing these truths, we can begin to take actions to-
ward transforming those idealistic myths into actual realities. The Article ends 
in the Conclusion with proposals for achieving that future goal. 
I. MYTH: SEX DISCRIMINATION IS NO LONGER PREVALENT 
Many think gender inequality and sex discrimination in the workplace are 
no longer prevalent. 
The Pew Research Center, for example, reports only 26% of Americans 
view sexism as a “big problem” with only 35% viewing it as small and 29% as 
not a problem at all.5 Or stated in the inverse, about three-quarters of Ameri-
cans buy into the myth that women do not face everyday sex discrimination. In 
another survey, many respondents indicate a similar sentiment. Men in particu-
lar believe that the country has done enough or even gone too far on gender 
equality, with 57% sharing that view.6 
A.  Sex Discrimination Persists 
The occasional news about a high-profile female chief executive7 might 
suggest that the workplace is now a place of equal opportunity, the glass ceiling 
 
5  In a Politically Polarized Era, Sharp Divides in Both Partisan Coalitions, PEW RSCH. CTR. 
(Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/12/17/in-a-politically-polarized-
era-sharp-divides-in-both-partisan-coalitions/ [perma.cc/23LF-XQWK]. 
6  John Gramlich, 10 Things We Learned About Gender Issues in the U.S. in 2017, PEW 
RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/12/28/10-things-
we-learned-about-gender-issues-in-the-u-s-in-2017/ [perma.cc/WP9E-E8LS]. Even 41% of 
women agreed. Id. 72% of Republicans agreed, in contrast to 30% of Democrats. Id. Specific 
inquiry: When it comes to giving equal rights with men, the country “has gone too far,” “has 
been about right,” or “hasn’t gone far enough.” Id. 
7  Emma Hinchliffe, The Number of Female CEOs in the Fortune 500 Hits an All-time Rec-
ord, FORTUNE (May 18, 2020, 4:15 AM), https://fortune.com/2020/05/18/women-ceos-
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is no-more, and the pipeline to positions of workplace leadership is as available 
to women as to men. Wrong. While progress has been made, widespread gen-
der discrepancies in rewards and treatment persist and, in fact, remain perva-
sive in many places in today’s workplace.8 The Pew Research Center, for ex-
ample, found that 42% of women indicate they have experienced gender 
discrimination at work.9 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) also reports that in 2019, there were 23,532 sex-based discrimination 
charges.10 
While sex discrimination is manifested in various ways, we briefly note 
three forms.11 First are pay gaps between women and men, second are disparate 
career patterns and underrepresentation across many industries and jobs, and 
third are microaggressions that are disproportionally directed at women. 
Earning inequality, as exemplified by pay gaps, is a commonly reported 
form of discrimination.12 Twenty-five percent of women say they earn less than 
 
fortune-500-2020 [perma.cc/YV44-LYZR] (but noting that 37 of 500 is only 7.4%); Sharon 
Terlep, Clorox, with Its Sales Soaring from the Coronavirus, to Get New CEO, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 3, 2020, 5:43 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/clorox-posts-higher-sales-as-
consumers-stock-up-on-disinfectants-11596454128 [https://perma.cc/8AVQ-86EB] (indicat-
ing only 5% of CEO’s at 500 largest companies are women). 
8  See, e.g., MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 7–8, 10–11; LAUREN PASQUARELLA 
DALEY, CATALYST, WOMEN AND THE FUTURE OF WORK 2–4 (2019); Stephen Turban et al., A 
Study Used Sensors to Show that Men and Women Are Treated Differently at Work, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Oct. 26, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/10/a-study-used-sensors-to-show-that-men-
and-women-are-treated-differently-at-work [perma.cc/B2AQ-3494]; Jessica M. Salerno et 
al., Closing with Emotion: The Differential Impact of Male Versus Female Attorneys Ex-
pressing Anger in Court, 42 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 385, 385 (2018); Byrd Pinkerton, He’s 
Brilliant, She’s Lovely: Teaching Computers to Be Less Sexist, NPR (Aug. 12, 2016, 8:01 
AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/08/12/489507182/hes-brilliant-sh 
es-lovely-teaching-computers-to-be-less-sexist [perma.cc/35Q3-874G]; see also Sex Dis-
crimination and Sexual Harassment: Quick Take, CATALYST (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.cat 
alyst.org/research/sex-discrimination-and-sexual-harassment/ [perma.cc/V4E8-SVW8]. Re-
search in certain occupations, such as for economists, has been particularly extensive. David 
Harrison, Female Economists, in Survey, Cite Gender Discrimination; Results Come as the 
Profession’s Treatment of Women Has Come Under Focus, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2019, 
2:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/female-economists-in-survey-citegender-discrimina 
tion-11552923797 [perma.cc/LU6T-KJ9D]; Colleen Flaherty, Anonymous Comments, Un-
masked Bias, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/201 
7/08/21/internet-can-be-brutal-place-women-economics-paper-finds [perma.cc/7PD9-EZZ 
Z]; Colleen Flaherty, Belief in Gender Bias and Promotions for Women, INSIDE HIGHER ED 
(Aug. 27, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2019/08/27/belief-
gender-bias-and-promotions-women [perma.cc/JVG3-ALGW]. 
9  Gramlich, supra note 6 (compared to 20% of men who said the same). 
10  Press Release, U.S. EEOC, EEOC Releases Fiscal Year 2019 Enforcement and Litigation 
Data (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-releases-fiscal-year-2019-enforc 
ement-and-litigation-data [perma.cc/WWB4-X77F] (includes both sexual harassment and 
other sex-based claims such as sex discrimination and retaliation). 
11  See discussion in notes 12–42 and accompanying text. 
12  The State of the Gender Pay Gap in 2020, PAYSCALE [hereinafter PayScale Report] 
https://www.payscale.com/data/gender-pay-gap [perma.cc/HH8Y-GJJJ]; see also Claire 
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a man doing the same job while just 5% thought they earned less than women 
doing the same job.13 A well-documented actual pay gap between men and 
women continues. Women make only 81 cents for every dollar men make in 
2020.14 “[T]he gender pay gap is wider for women of color, women in execu-
tive level roles, women in certain occupations and industries, and in 
some . . . states.”15 
The impact of these lost wages on lifetime earnings can be significant with 
hundreds of thousands of dollars and an improved standard of living at stake.16 
Researchers predict that women in general will lose $900,000 on average over 
a lifetime.17 Furthermore, the researchers conclude that the gender wage gap 
cannot be fully explained by differences in education, experience, occupation, 
and personal decisions. “[W]omen are still being paid less than men due to no 
attributable reason other than gender.”18 
As a PayScale study describes:  
      Women are paid less relative to men for every occupation . . . . [W]omen 
make up the majority of the workforce in support, service, and wellbeing-related 
occupations such as community & social services, education, training & library, 
healthcare practitioners, healthcare support, office and administrative support, 
and personal care & services.  
      Although it might stand to reason that the gender wage gap would be smaller 
in occupations where women dominate, the data showed no such pattern. For 
example, women dominate in the legal industry, which is 53 percent women and 
47 percent men. However, legal had the largest gender wage gap in the study, 
 
Cain Miller, As Women Take over a Male-Dominated Field, the Pay Drops, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/upshot/as-women-take-over-a-male-
dominated-field-the-pay-drops.html [https://perma.cc/9W3J-V8JY]; Jen Hubley Luckwaldt, 
When an Occupation Becomes Female-Dominated, Pay Declines, PAYSCALE (Mar. 21, 
2016), https://www.payscale.com/career-news/2016/03/when-an-occupation-becomes-femal 
e-dominated-pay-declines [perma.cc/6VWL-4JAU]; Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, 
The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and Explanations, 55 J. ECON. LITERATURE 789, 789 
(2017) (“[T]he gender pay gap decline[s] much more slowly at the top of the wage distribu-
tion than at the middle or [the] bottom . . . . [T]raditional explanations [for a gender pay gap] 
continue to have salience. . . . Gender differences in occupations and industries, as well as 
differences in gender roles and the gender division of labor remain important, and research 
based on experimental evidence strongly suggests that discrimination cannot be discounted. 
Psychological attributes or noncognitive skills comprise one of the newer explanations for 
gender differences in outcomes. Our effort to assess the quantitative evidence on the im-
portance of these factors suggests that they account for a small to moderate portion of the 
gender pay gap, considerably smaller than, say, occupation and industry effects, though they 
appear to modestly contribute to these differences.”). 
13  PayScale Report, supra note 12. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
16  Id. 
17  Id. When taking into account all kinds of variables (controlled group), the lost earnings 
are less at $80,000. Id. However, given lost investment income from those incremental earn-
ings over forty years, that gap is significant. Id. 
18  Id. 
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suggesting that women and men don’t have the same jobs levels or titles within 
the legal profession statistically.19 
The pay gap is greater in some industries, such as finance and insurance.20 
And even what sounds like good news in other industries needs to be studied 
more carefully. When controlling for many factors—for instance in technology 
and engineering and science—pay equity appears to be achieved.21 “However, 
there is a large difference between the controlled and uncontrolled gender pay 
gaps in these sectors.”22 “Among other things, this is indicative of women and 
men not having the same job levels or job titles.”23 
A second example of evidence of sex discrimination is the different career 
patterns and underrepresentation of women in many settings. While there are 
select examples of women in all kinds of leadership roles,24 the bigger picture 
reveals ongoing gender underrepresentation all along the workplace pipeline 
and patterns of bias. For example, in addition to the issues in pay equity in the 
technology, engineering, and science industries described above, women make 
up only 29% of the tech industry and 38% of engineering and science work-
ers.25 
A large-scale multi-year research project by McKinsey Consultants 
(McKinsey Report) illustrates the gender disparities across many settings and 
across time.26 Their research is based on a survey of hundreds of companies in 
the private, public, and social sectors.27 Thousands of employees are included.28 
Among other findings in their 2018 report are the following: 
      Based on four years of data from 462 companies employing almost 20 mil-
lion people, including the 279 companies participating in this year’s study, two 
 
19  Id. (“Education, training & library occupations have [a large] uncontrolled pay gap, de-
spite that women make up the vast majority of educators. Women in these jobs earn $0.72 
for every dollar earned by men, even though 74 percent . . . are women. Although women 
represent a larger portion of this sector’s workforce, many teach primary education. Most 
men . . . teach secondary education, where head coaching and administrative duties are more 
available than in elementary school settings. Such leadership opportunities [can then lead to] 
administrative roles with higher salaries. These disparities are compounded when taken with 
the harmful stereotypes that women are poor leaders or bad with finances, two pejoratives 
that thicken the glass ceiling.”). 
20  Id. (“Finance & insurance has the largest uncontrolled wage gap ($0.76), followed by 
agencies & consultancies ($0.81), healthcare ($0.83), retail & customer service ($0.83), and 
transportation & warehousing ($0.84). Industries with the smallest uncontrolled wage gaps 
include arts, entertainment & recreation ($0.93) and real estate & rental/leasing ($0.92).”). 
21  Id. 
22  Id. 
23  Id. 
24  See CATALYST, WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP AT S&P/ TSX COMPANIES 3 (2020). 
25  PayScale Report, supra note 12; see also MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 46 
(noting pay gaps when women enter higher paying occupations). 
26  MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 69 (noting many gender disparities in compen-
sation and other rewards across many industries and professions are documented). 
27  Id. at 68. 
28  Id. at 1. 
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things are clear: [one,] [w]omen remain significantly underrepresented, particu-
larly women of color. [Two,] [c]ompanies need to change the way they hire and 
promote entry- and manager-level employees to make real progress.  
      Since 2015, the first year of this study, corporate America has made almost 
no progress in improving women’s representation. Women are underrepresented 
at every level, and women of color are the most underrepresented group of all, 
lagging behind white men, men of color, and white women. 29 
Their evidence further reveals that obstacles to success appear quickly in 
women’s careers. The data shows a “broken rung” in the promotion ladder, 
where women are not promoted as much as men from entry level to first-level 
management.30 For every 100 men promoted, only 72 women are promoted.31 
Not surprising given this broken rung, men hold 62% of all manager-level posi-
tions (including more senior levels) and women hold only 38%.32 There is some 
progress in leadership roles, but still underrepresentation. Only one in five C-
suite executives is a woman; only one in twenty-five is a woman of color.33 
The McKinsey Report 2018 study also found that attrition is not the expla-
nation for underrepresentation.34 The same percentage of men and women leave 
their companies (about 15% annually).35 When they leave their current employ-
er, the same percent of women and men stay in the workforce (81–82%) and 
only a small percent of women (2%) leave to focus on family.36 
A third type of often underreported sex discrimination is microaggressions 
disproportionately directed at women workers. Microaggressions are everyday 
slights that may appear small when isolated but indicate patterns of inequality 
over time.37 As the McKinsey Report indicates, women report that they are 
more likely than men to be subjected to an array of microaggressions at work.38 
They include others questioning their competence, being overlooked, and being 
disrespected.39 How are these microaggressions manifested and measured? As 
further delineated below, women’s competence is questioned in the following 
ways: they need to provide more evidence of their competence, or they have 
their judgment questioned in their areas of expertise.40 Women are overlooked 
 
29  RACHEL THOMAS ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE 2018, at 5–6 
(2018) [hereinafter MCKINSEY REPORT 2018]. 
30  MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 12–14. 
31  Id. at 10–11. 
32  Id. at 11; see also Vanessa Fuhrmans, Where Women Fall Behind at Work: The First Step 
into Management, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 15, 2019, 12:18 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wh 
ere-women-fall-behind-at-work-the-first-step-into-management-11571112361 [perma.cc/DD 
M3-DKFC]. 
33  MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 9. 
34  MCKINSEY REPORT 2018, supra note 29, at 7. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. 
37  MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 48. 
38  Id. at 48–49. 
39  Id. 
40  Id. at 49.  
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when interrupted, spoken over, or denied credit for their ideas.41 Women are 
disrespected by being mistaken for someone at a lower level, by demeaning 
remarks about them or people like them, by others’ surprise at their language 
skills, or by feeling like they cannot talk about themselves or their lives outside 
of work.42 
 HOW WOMEN EXPERIENCE MICROAGGRESSIONS DISPROPORTIONATELY43 
Women’s Competence Questioned 
• More evidence of their competence required (30% of women versus 14% of men) 
• Judgment questioned in their area of expertise (38% of women versus 29% of men)  
Women Overlooked 
• Interrupted or spoken over (50% of women versus 34% of men),  
• Not getting credit for their ideas (38% of women versus 27% of men)  
Women Disrespected 
• Mistaken for someone at a lower level (18% of women versus 9% of men)  
• Demeaning remarks (16% of women versus 11% of men)  
• Surprise at their language skills (14% of women versus 8% of men)  
• Feeling like they cannot talk about themselves (10% of women versus 7% of men) 
 
 
The McKinsey Report also reveals that certain groups of women describe 
more microaggressions than women in general. Lesbian women, bisexual 
women, and women with disabilities are more likely to have their competence 
questioned, be overlooked, or be disrespected.44 For example, 46% of bisexual 
women need to provide more evidence of their competence (in contrast to 14% 
of men); 64% of bisexual women are interrupted or spoken over (in contrast to 
34% of men).45 Forty percent of Black women are more likely to have their 
competence questioned and are disrespected (in contrast to 30% of women in 
general and 14% of men).46 Women who are alone in their workplace also suf-
fer microaggressions disproportionately.47 They are more likely than women 
who are not the only woman in their workplace to have their competence ques-
tioned (49% to 51% versus 20 to 30% of women who are not alone), and more 
likely to be overlooked (52% to 68% versus 29% to 40% of women who are 
not alone).48 
 
41  Id. 
42  Id. 
43  Id. 
44  Id.  
45  Id. 
46  Id. 
47  Id. at 52. 
48  Id. at 53. Of more than 9,000 respondents in an American Economic Survey, about two-
thirds of female economists believe their work is not taken as seriously as the work of male 
economists. See Harrison, supra note 8. Their beliefs are supported by research showing that 
postings on an anonymous discussion board for economics students describe women’s phys-
ical characteristics rather than the merits of their work, in contrast to a more predictable dis-
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B. Why Do We Believe Otherwise? 
Given the clear empirical evidence of sex discrimination—as illustrated 
above by compensation disparities, underrepresentation and pipeline problems, 
and disproportionate microaggressions—how are we able to deny these gender 
disparities? How can the reality of sex discrimination be supplanted with the 
mistaken belief that sex discrimination is no longer prevalent? We are able to 
do this in part by telling ourselves “stories” that rationalize what is really hap-
pening.49 
Sociologist Arianne Renan Barzilay proposes that men, and to some extent 
women, accept gendered treatment because it is consistent with broader societal 
views.50 She posits that we learn these inequities and tolerate them without 
even thinking about it.51 I suggest that we capture these societal views in the 
stories we tell about the way the world functions. I discuss, for instance, two 
rationalizing stories that allow us to ignore sex discrimination in the workplace. 
The first is the story that there are natural and appropriate roles for women and 
men that justify discrimination in the workplace; the second story is that it is 
just a matter of time for women to achieve parity and that it is largely up to 
women to do so. 
1. Narrative: The Ideal Man, the Ideal Woman, and the Ideal Worker 
Could it be that sex discrimination is explained in part by American socie-
ty’s belief that there are natural and therefore appropriate male and female 
roles? Furthermore, do these gendered roles result in discrimination in the 
workplace? 
Barzilay proposes that we have idealized versions of gender roles, what I 
label as the “ideal woman” and the “ideal man”.52 At the same time, we also 
have an idealized version of an “ideal worker” who has characteristics we asso-
ciate with committed and desirable workers who deserve success and job re-
wards.53 Society’s image of the “ideal worker” is an employee who is totally 
devoted to their job and their bosses’ and employers’ business goals.54 They do 
not have distracting family and household duties and obligations.55 
 
cussion of the merits of men’s work. Id. Another study show that female economists have a 
harder time than men in placing their work in professional journals. Id. 
49  See, e.g., David Robson, The Sexist Myths That Won’t Die, BBC (Sept. 30, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190930-the-sexist-myths-about-gender-stereotypes-
that-wont-die [perma.cc/GP8K-P6GC]. 
50  Arianne Renan Barzilay, Discrimination Without Discriminating? Learned Gender Ine-
quality in the Labor Market and Gig Economy, 28 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 545, 554, 
557, 563 (2019). 
51  Id. at 554. 
52  Id. at 558–59. 
53  Id. 
54  Id. at 558. 
55  Id. 
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Conveniently, this ideal worker is consistent with the description of the 
ideal man who takes care of himself and his family financially by working very 
hard for his company, factory, or institution.56 Embedded in many ways in 
American society, an ideal man proves his masculinity through his “macho” 
image of protecting women and children57 and bringing home the essential re-
sources to help his family survive. A man’s workplace, consistent with the nat-
ural order of gender roles, is to work outside the home. 
In contrast, the ideal woman incorporates the motherhood myth that wom-
en are best suited and naturally disposed toward parenting and nurturing the 
family as a whole. Thus, ideally for society’s sake, a woman should responsibly 
stay home and take care of raising the children and creating a loving and ap-
propriately supportive home environment.58 
Motherhood myths include the assumptions that women, by their very nature, 
are endowed with parenting abilities, that at-home mothers are bonded to their 
children, providing them with unrivalled nurturing surroundings. Conversely, 
motherhood myths pathologised alternative mothering models, depicting em-
ployed mothers as neglecting their duty of caring, threatening the family rela-
tionships and jeopardizing mother-children bondings.59 
This tension between being an ideal woman and an ideal worker uncon-
sciously disadvantages women in the workplace. Perhaps employers’ and col-
leagues’ sex discrimination, manifested for instance in their microaggressions 
and workplace decisions, is an unconscious way for them to lash out at women 
who they think really should not be working at all or at least not so ambitiously. 
Comparative research, for instance, suggests that women and men across 
many countries use motherhood myths to justify sex discrimination in the 
workplace.60 This research further reveals that countries who adhere most to the 
motherhood myth area also more likely to have other indices of sex discrimina-
tion.61 
2. Narrative: It’s Just a Matter of Time 
My observations are that those who believe that sex discrimination is not a 
real problem are also comforted by the mantra “It’s just a matter of time.” They 
rationalize that a few “things” just have to fall in place, and that they will over 
time.62 Further, they imagine that the amount and timing of gender progress is 
 
56  Id. at 558–59. 
57  See, e.g., KRISTIN KOBES DU MEZ, JESUS AND JOHN WAYNE: HOW WHITE EVANGELICALS 
CORRUPTED A FAITH AND FRACTURED A NATION 76, 84, 91 (2020). 
58  Catherine Verniers & Jorge Vala, Justifying Gender Discrimination in the Workplace: 
The M ediating Role of Motherhood Myths, 13 PLOS ONE, Jan. 2018, at 3, 14, 16, 18. 
59  Id. at 3 (internal citations omitted). 
60  Id. at 14. 
61  Id. at 14, 16. 
62  Id. at 2. 
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largely under the control of women.63 Hence, to the extent there are any gender 
differences in the workplace, they are attributable to women’s efforts and 
choices.64 
Thus, when faced with the reality of women’s pay gap or their lags in ad-
vancement, a common story is that women simply lack the necessary job skills 
and conduct. Men, the reasoning goes, have mastered the necessary job skills 
and conduct that lead to their success. Specifically, men have mentors, have 
contact with company leaders, and are active in their communications and so-
cial networks.65 Women, on the other hand, lack mentoring relationships and 
the necessary networking skills.66 Once women behave appropriately (e.g., 
have mentors and network), they too will be successful. “It’s just a matter of 
time.” 
Stephen Turban and his colleagues deconstruct this story and its assump-
tions.67 They conducted an extensive case study of a large American company 
where women are not getting promoted.68 They researched whether men and 
women do in fact have different skills and behave differently.69 Their extensive 
case study is of a large multinational firm where women were 35–40% of the 
entry-level employees but only 20% of those in upper management.70 Women 
were not advancing.71 
Turban’s research methodology was to use sophisticated monitoring devic-
es to track email communications and meetings, and also to meticulously track 
employees in-person behavior throughout their workday.72 Using sociometric 
sensors that measure speech patterns and employees’ movement, they were 
able to determine who talks with whom, where and when people communicate, 
and who dominates conversations.73 
 
63  See MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 8, 13, 17 (evidencing the many ways that 
gender progress is not under the control of women). 
64  See, e.g., MCKINSEY REPORT 2018, supra note 29, at 4, 7, 9, 32–34, 58, 60. Sex discrimi-
nation is not attributable to women’s choices in the McKinsey Report. Id. at 4, 7, 34. Contra-
ry to a common belief that that women do not have the same salaries because they simply do 
not ask for better pay, the evidence here is that they do ask for better salaries. Id. In addition, 
the report indicates that women do not leave jobs for family reasons any more than men do. 
Id. The MCKINSEY REPORT 2018 also discusses at length the many external workplace barri-
ers to gender progress. Pages 10–15 offer a summary, for instance, of the way that women 
get less support than men from managers in providing necessary resources, help with navi-
gating organizational politics, etc. Id. at 10–15. 
65  Id. 
66  Id. 
67  Turban, supra note 8. 
68  Id. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. 
71  Id. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. 
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The researchers found no perceptible differences in men and women’s 
conduct regarding mentors, networking, and communication patterns.74 Both 
groups had the same number of contacts and time with senior leadership.75 Men 
and women even had the same performance evaluations.76 Turban and his col-
leagues’ explanation for their findings is straightforward: the gender inequality 
that shows up in women’s lack of promotion is attributable to management bi-
as, not to differences in women’s behavior.77 Women are perceived and treated 
differently; the same behavior and performance do not reap the same rewards 
as for men. 
Jessica Salerno and her colleagues research on lawyers78 also is contrary to 
the story that “it’s just a matter of time.” The accompanying narratives are that 
women are still comparatively new to their jobs and careers, they still have in-
sufficient skills and have not learned the conduct necessary for success, and 
that this skills-building are things that women can fix if they want.79 
In Salerno’s study, participants view videos of a male or a female attorney 
giving the same closing statement in a murder case, either in a calm tone or in 
an angry one.80 While attorneys are ordinarily expected to be calm and rational, 
trial attorneys are trained to be emotional in the courtroom when telling their 
“narrative” to the jurors. Prosecuting attorneys, for instance, “delivering a clos-
ing statement in a case involving a mother who was murdered in heinous man-
ner in front of her infant child” are expected and trained to be emotional.81 
Their anger is professionally appropriate, anticipated, and endorsed as a way to 
convince jurors of the defendant’s brutal and outrageous act. 
Asked to evaluate the attorney’s effectiveness, the participants’ assessment 
of male and female attorneys differ.82 Male lawyers’ anger is more likely to be 
described as commanding, powerful, and competent; and participants are more 
likely to hire them for their effectiveness.83 Female lawyers’ anger, in contrast, 
are more likely described as shrill, hysterical, and grating; and participants are 
more likely to consider them ineffective and not hire them.84 In other words, 
angry male litigators who were exhibiting professionally appropriate behavior 
and skills under the circumstances are perceived positively. Angry female liti-
gators, also exhibiting professionally appropriate behavior and skills were per-
 
74  Id. 
75  Id.  
76  Id.  
77  Id. 
78  Salerno, supra note 8, at 388. 
79  See, e.g., MCKINSEY REPORT 2018, supra note 29, at 11 (illustrating lack of management 
support for women’s success), 29 (noting that women do ask for higher salaries and promo-
tions). 
80  Salerno, supra note 8 at 388. 
81  Id. 
82  Id. at 390. 
83  Id. 
84  Id. at 394. 
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ceived negatively.85 Also striking, both male and female participants evaluated 
the attorneys in these gender-biased ways.86 
In other words, the Salerno study results document that women lawyers are 
still discriminated against even though they demonstrate the appropriate profes-
sional skills. Others’ negative assessment of them is not attributable to women 
lawyers’ building the necessary skills and adapting the appropriate professional 
conduct. It is not just a matter of their time. 
In summary, despite the societal myth that sex discrimination is no longer 
prevalent, the empirical evidence confirms otherwise. One way we perpetuate 
this myth is the underlying stories we tell—such as the ones about the discon-
nect between the ideal woman and the ideal worker, and the false narratives 
that progress is inevitable and any lack of progress is attributable to women 
themselves. Further, as we discuss below, the ongoing prevalence of sex dis-
crimination is related to sexual harassment. 
II. MYTH: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IS NO LONGER PREVALENT 
A. Sexual Harassment and Sex Discrimination 
As with sex discrimination, many do not believe that sexual harassment 
continues to be widespread. According to a Gallup poll, the percentage of 
Americans viewing sexual harassment as a major problem actually decreased 
between 2017 and 2019, with only 53% of men considering it a major problem 
in 2019 compared to 66% in 2017.87 
Empirical research, however, indicates a different reality about the preva-
lence of sexual harassment. A large-scale government study (Feldblum Re-
port)88 reveals a staggering 60% of female workers in all kinds of settings re-
port some form of gender harassment.89 The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) statistics also are telling. Last year, 12,739 employee 
charges of sex-based harassment were filed with the EEOC.90 Further, the 
McKinsey Report based on a survey of organizational settings, finds that two in 
five women in their careers have experienced sexual harassment—including 
being touched in inappropriately sexual ways, receiving unwanted attempts to 
 
85  Id. at 394. 
86  Id. at 397.  
87  Brenan, supra note 1 (increasing concerns for accused men and backlash from me-too). 
88  CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, U.S. EEOC, SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE 
STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/select-task-force-
study-harassment-workplace [perma.cc/FN98-TVRZ] (definition of gender harassment; 
sampling techniques); see also Sex Discrimination and Sexual Harassment: Quick Take, su-
pra note 8. 
89  FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88. 
90  Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 2010 - FY 2019, 
U.S. EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/charges-alleging-sex-based-harassment-charges-
filed-eeoc-fy-2010-fy-2019 [perma.cc/LU58-LQ5R]. 
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have an intimate relationship, and hearing sexist jokes.91 Some groups are par-
ticularly likely to report harassment: lesbian women, bisexual women, women 
with disabilities, and women in technical roles.92 More detailed research in cer-
tain professional areas, such as one on the legal profession,93 offer a detailed 
expose of sexual harassment in a particular setting. And considering that an es-
timated 90% of those who are harassed do not publicly complain, all these sta-
tistics grossly underestimate actual sexual harassment.94 
As the McKinsey Report illustrates, sexual harassment includes many 
forms of conduct.95 At one extreme, it includes unwanted sexual advances, sex-
ual assault, and rape. But it also includes “hostile behavior, physical assault, 
patronizing treatment, personal ridicule, social ostracism, exclusion or margin-
alization, denial of information, and work sabotage.”96 What all these forms of 
conduct have in common are that women are being targeted in these disadvan-
taged and unwanted ways because of their sex or sexual orientation. The result 
is a work culture that is hostile to women because they are women. 
Not realizing that sexual harassment continues to be prevalent is not the 
only thing we do not acknowledge. We also view sex discrimination and sexual 
harassment as very different phenomena. We believe that sexual harassment is 
driven specifically by sexual attraction and desire while sex discrimination is a 
much broader phenomenon predicated on fundamental beliefs such as those de-
scribed in Part I.97 But sex discrimination and sexual harassment actually have 
a common basis. 
 
91  MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 50. 
92  Id. (table: 53% of lesbian women, 62% of bisexual women, 51% of women with disabili-
ties, 48% of women in technical roles, and senior level women 59%). 
93  An extensive empirical study of the legal profession found the following:  
[1.] The [e]xtent and [b]readth of [m]isconduct/[h]arassment [a]re [i]nsidious and [a]larming[. 
. . . 2.] Reporting [s]ystems [i]ntended to [d]iscourage and [c]apture [h]arassing [i]ncidents [a]re 
[m]ostly [n]ot [w]orking[. . . 3.] Most [h]arassers [f]ace [f]ew or [n]o [a]dverse 
[c]onsequences[. . . . 4.] The “[p]rice” [t]hat [w]omen, in [p]articular, [p]ay and the [c]ost to 
[o]rganizations and the [p]rofession [a]re [c]onsiderable[. . . . 5.] People at [e]very [l]evel—
[i]ncluding [w]omen in [p]owerful [p]ositions—[a]re [b]eing [h]arassed[. . . . 6.] Age, 
[r]ace/[e]thnicity and [g]ender [i]dentity [a]re [p]erceived as [c]ompounding [d]imensions. 
WOMEN LAWYERS ON GUARD INC., STILL BROKEN: SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND MISCONDUCT 
IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 6, 8, 19–22 (2020). 
94  FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88 (EEOC statistics would predict over 190,000 workers 
who feel harassed). Sexual harassment is not limited to workplaces. For instance, there is 
increased recognition of sexual harassment and assault on college campuses. See, e.g., 
Michelle J. Anderson, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and Resistance to Reform, 125 
YALE L.J. 1940, 1969 (2016); Jonathan Broder, Title IX and Campus Sexual Assault, 29 CQ 
RESEARCHER 1, 4–5, 15 (2020). 
95  MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 48, 50. 
96  Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J. F. 22, 27 
(2018) [hereinafter Schultz 2018]. 
97  See supra notes 49-61. 
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As Vicki Shultz proposes in her pioneering work,98 sexual domination and 
exploitation may not be the only or even the primary motivation for sexual har-
assment. Men instead sexually harass women because of their “drive to main-
tain the most highly rewarded forms of works as domains of masculine compe-
tence.”99 Harassment’s purpose is to denigrate women’s competence so they are 
seen as inferior and less capable workers, and therefore prevented from male-
dominated jobs.100 
Shultz bluntly states: “Sexual harassment has always been more about sex-
ism than it is about sex.”101 It bolsters an idealized masculine work identity and 
status,102 and is consistent with a broader workplace culture of viewing and 
treating women in professionally demeaning and devaluing ways:103 
Motivated by both material considerations and equally powerful psychological 
ones, harassment provides a means for men to mark their jobs as male territory 
and to discourage any women who seek to enter. By keeping women in their 
place in the workplace, men secure superior status in the home, in the polity, and 
in the larger culture as well.104 
Furthermore, it takes only a few men, particularly if the supervisor acqui-
esces, to create a hostile environment for any women daring to upset the “natu-
ral order” of gender segregation.105 For women who hold nontraditional jobs, 
harassment exaggerates gender differences to remind them they are out of place 
for a man’s world. As Brazilay reminds us, the “ideal man” is traditionally 
viewed as the breadwinner with mastery of uniquely masculine competen-
cies.106 When the presence of women threatens their status, men use harassment 
as a means to reinforce gender differences and protect their masculine-
 
98  Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1755 (1998) 
[hereinafter Schultz 1998]; Schultz 2018, supra note 96, at 27 (2018). 
99  Schultz 1998, supra note 98, at 1755. Schultz also describes a “competence-centered” 
paradigm. Id. Harassment is used “as a means [for men] to reclaim favored lines of work and 
work competence as masculine-identified turf—in the face of a threat posed by the presence 
of women (or lesser men) who seek to claim these prerogatives as their own.” Id. She notes 
all kinds of ways that women are denigrated and demeaned. Id. at 1763–66. 
100  Id. at 1762. 
101  Schultz 2018, supra note 96, at 22. 
102  Id. at 24. 
103  Schultz 1998, supra note 98, at 1762–63. 
104  Id. 
105  Id. at 1759 (internal quotations omitted). 
106  Barzilay, supra note 50, at 558, 563; see also THE ASSISTANT (Bleecker Street Media 
2020) (a film depicting how harassment can become an unspoken part of workplace culture); 
Justin Chang, ‘The Assistant’ Helps Explain How Predatory Behavior Stays Hidden, NPR 
(Jan. 28, 2020, 1:49 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/01/28/800408643/the-assistant-helps-
explain-how-predatory-behavior-stays-hidden [perma.cc/3S4X-9798]. Surveys of econo-
mists illustrate, for instance, an interactive relationship: female economists face professional 
denigration in various ways and report being victims of attempted or actual sexual assaults 
or touched in ways that make them feel uncomfortable. See Blau & Kahn, supra note 12, at 
836–37; Harrison, supra note 8. 
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identified turf. Sexual harassment is about control and power rather than sexual 
desire.107 
Moreover, studies show that sexual harassment is more likely in settings 
that evidence gender disparities more generally. For example, women are par-
ticularly susceptible to harassment in workplaces that are homogeneously male; 
and where men are significantly over-represented relative to women.108 Men 
dominate in technology related industries and energy related industries, with 
significant female underrepresentation throughout the pipeline from the entry 
level on.109 A worker who is the only woman in a group, such as a team, de-
partment, or location also is more susceptible. Those in the minority or alone 
can feel isolated and vulnerable; and those who are in the majority might feel 
threatened or uncomfortable around those not like them.110 
Sexual harassment is also more probable in settings with power disparities, 
such as when workers hold positions with less status, authority, and compensa-
tion.111 Examples are employees holding positions subject to others’ direction, 
such as administrative support staff, nurses and other allied health profession-
als, maintenance personnel, and entry level positions. When men have the deci-
sion-making power, they may feel emboldened to exploit low-ranking employ-
ees who may feel they have no choice and also do not understand their rights.112 
Shultz relates these two risk factors of homogenous workplaces and power 
disparities in her discussion of “sex segregation,” that is, workplaces where 
men have jobs with the most power and status while women hold lower-status 
positions:113 
This state of affairs fosters sex stereotypes—for example, a sense that men are 
leaders or geniuses while women are followers, . . . prompting the dominant 
group to perceive any minorities who enter their jobs as “different” and out of 
place, and to close ranks against them to defend . . . their superior workplace po-
sitions and associated masculinities . . . .”114 
The situation is worse still if supervisors’ decision-making authority is sub-
jective and unconstrained. Without the power and safety of more women at all 
levels, harassed women “cannot effectively censor or counter stereotypes and 
 
107  Zeba Blay, Sexual Harassment Isn’t About Sex, It’s About Power, HUFFPOST (Mar. 23, 
2017, 5:12 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/sexual-harassment-isnt-about-sex-its-about 
-power_n_58d13b9fe4b00705db52c340 [https://perma.cc/3AJ2-4JU3]. 
108  Schultz 1998, supra note 98, at 1759. 
109  Technology related industries include, for e.g., hardware, information technology ser-
vices and telecom; and energy related industries include, for e.g., utilities and basic materi-
als, oil and gas. See MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 66–67 (for data on these and 
other industries, including along the pipeline). 
110  FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88, at 14. 
111  Id. 
112  Id. 
113  Schultz 2018, supra note 96, at 49–50. 
114  Id. at 49. 
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cannot effectively deter, resist, or report harassment.”115 At the same time, they 
are not in positions that can meaningfully reshape the organization’s culture so 
that it becomes a more inclusive environment. 
Research also suggests that certain types of employees are more vulnera-
ble, for example, young workers, workers with cultural and language differ-
ences, and employees with sexual orientation differences.116 More established 
and older employees may target newer and younger employees where the pow-
er imbalance is great, and who they expect will be less likely to resist their ad-
vances.117 Workers with cultural and language differences may fear for their 
jobs if they do not conform to others’ social pressures.118 And workers with 
sexual orientation differences may be targeted as particularly threatening to 
those with more traditional views of male and female roles.119 
B.  Franchina v. City of Providence 
Franchina v. City of Providence120 illustrates a case where sex discrimina-
tion and sexual harassment are interconnected, and where sexual desire does 
not appear to be a motive for the harassment.121 It also illustrates how the risk 
factors described above fuel Lori Francina’s “hostile work environment.” 
 
115  Id. 
116  FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88, at 8, 14. 
117  See, e.g., THE ASSISTANT, supra note 106. 
118  Chart of Risk Factors for Harassment and Responsive Strategies, U.S. EEOC, https://ww 
w.eeoc.gov/chart-risk-factors-harassment-and-responsive-strategies [https://perma.cc/6AQZ-
GWY3]. 
119  MCKINSEY REPORT 2018, supra note 29, at 18, 20. 
120  Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2018). 
121  Judge Thompson offers a detailed description of the facts, noting that though the City of 
Providence “trivializes” the plaintiff Lori Franchina’s negative work experiences while 
working with the Fire Department, the court “decline[s] to be as pithy in reciting Franchina’s 
plight” in order to provide the proper context in which this case occurs. Id. at 38. 
      Another detailed accounting of sexual harassment, albeit in a very different setting, is 
given in Chira & Einhorn, supra note 2. It is the story of a decades long, recurrent history of 
sexual and racial harassment normalized by persistent and resilient cultural norms in two 
Ford manufacturing plants in Chicago. Id. Chicago Assembly Plant manufactured cars and 
its workforce is predominantly Black; Chicago Stamping Plant provided automobile parts 
and its workforce is majority White. Id. In 2017, there were 5700 workers at both plants and 
one-third were women Id. Both settings are unionized. Id. Their jobs are considered “golden 
tickets”—coveted positions, with good pay, benefits, and relative security. Id. 
      However, beginning in the 1970s when women first worked permanently at the plants 
and on the line, incidents of sexual harassment became numerous and insidious. Id. In the 
1990s, Ford and the EEOC agreed to pay $22 million prompted by lawsuits and Ford’s 
commitment to remedy the situation. Id. And while federal monitoring continued, the work-
place apparently did improve. Id. But as federal monitoring ended, a culture of sexual har-
assment returned. Id. In 2017, Ford and the EEOC again reached a settlement of $10 million 
for sexual and racial harassment, with five years of federal monitoring. Id. Numerous law-
suits are also still pending. Id. 
       The following case illustrates the intolerable working environment for women. Id. Ms. 
Suzette Wright happily accepted a job as a data entry clerk at Ford, feeling fortunate to land 
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Lori Franchina had no problems during the first four years of being a fire-
fighter.122 To the contrary, after graduating tenth in her 80-person class at the 
Providence Firefighter Academy, the Fire Department repeatedly recognized 
her for her high performance and promoted her to Lieutenant.123 Her problems 
began when she was assigned to work a shift with Andre Ferro, with Franchina 
as the shift supervisor and Ferro as her driver.124 Ferro was a misogynist fire-
fighter with a history of sexual harassment in the Department.125 He quickly 
lived up to his reputation: 
After arriving at the station for her shift and while pouring herself a cup of cof-
fee, Franchina was immediately approached by Ferro who, without missing a 
beat, asked if she was a lesbian. . . . After Franchina retorted that it was none of 
his business, Ferro followed up with the statement, “I don’t normally like to 
work with women; but, you know, we like the same thing, so I think we’re going 
to get along.” Franchina testified she was appalled by his comments and as his 
supervisor, instructed him not to say such things.126 
 
a job at the big company that offered job security. Id. She quickly learned the downsides of 
the environment for her and other women. Id. 
      As Ms. Wright settled in, she asked a co-worker to explain something: Why were men call-
ing out “peanut butter legs” when she arrived in the morning? He demurred, but she insisted. 
“He said: ‘Well peanut butter,’ ” Ms. Wright recalled. “ ‘Not only is it the color of your legs, but 
it’s the kind of legs you like to spread.’ ” 
      Like many of the females who eventually sued Ford, Ms. Wright is African-American; those 
accused of harassment include black, white and Latino men. Some of the women felt doubly vic-
timized—propositioned and denounced as sluts while also being called “black bitches” and other 
racial slurs. . . . As the affronts continued—lewd comments, repeated come-ons, men grabbing 
their crotches and moaning every time she bent over—Ms. Wright tried to ignore them. Veteran 
female employees warned that reporting the behavior brought only more trouble. The smallest 
infraction, routinely overlooked, suddenly merited a write-up. The very nature of factory work—
the pressure to keep the production line going—gave bosses power to inflict petty humiliations, 
such as denying bathroom breaks. 
      But after a man Ms. Wright had trusted as a mentor made a crack about paying her $5 for 
oral sex, she asked her union representative for help. He began what she calls a “don’t-file-a-
claim-against-Bill” campaign: Her co-worker would lose his job, his benefits, his pension, she 
was told. Rumors spread, questioning their relationship. Then a union official delivered the final 
insult: “Suzette, you’re a pretty woman—take it as a compliment.” 
Id. 
      Instead, Ms. Wright felt that: “Each time that I was taking it, again and again, it just 
felt like more of me diminishing . . . until [I] was just like a shell of a person.” Id. 
      Ford thus exemplifies a stratified workplace with large power disparities; a workplace 
considered a male turf with an engrained culture of sexually abusive that resurfaces when 
external supervision is removed. Women, typically minority women, are vulnerable because 
they fear losing their jobs and so are hesitant to complain or resist. The union is also incon-
sistent in their position, especially when both the accused and the accusers are union mem-
bers. 
122  See Franchina, 881 F.3d at 38.  
123  Id.  
124  Id. at 38–39. 
125  Id. at 38. 
126  Id. at 39. 
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Soon after, an emergency call came in and [they] were . . . dispatched. During 
the emergency run [together,] Ferro continued with [his] inappropriate [sexual 
comments]. He asked, for example, if Franchina wanted to have children and 
quickly followed up with, “could help you with that,” implying that he wanted 
to impregnate her. So incessant was the unprofessional chatter that Franchina 
was forced to tell Ferro on multiple occasions to stop talking because she was 
having difficulty hearing the dispatcher’s instructions.127 
During the same shift, Franchina and Ferro were sent to the Rhode Island 
Hospital.128 During the shift, Ferro approached a group of six firefighters in-
cluding Franchina who were chatting together.129  
Ferro approached the group and began rubbing his nipples in a circular 
fashion, leapt up in the air, and screamed at Franchina, “My lesbian lover! How 
are you doing?” Nurses, doctors, patients, and patients’ families were all pre-
sent . . . Franchina . . . was horrified and felt belittled. . .  Others . . . were simi-
larly appalled.130 
Back at the station at the end of the shift, Franchina went to her personal 
quarters to change out of her uniform.131 Without knocking and against proto-
col, Ferro intruded on Franchina, dressed only in his underwear.132 Franchina, 
dressed only in her undergarments, quickly grabbed a sheet to cover herself.133 
She asked Ferro to leave, but only after telling him to “get the fuck out” of the 
room did Ferro leave.134 
Franchina did not initially report Ferro’s “repulsive” behavior.135 But Chief 
Curt Varone heard about it and filed a written complaint against Ferro with the 
possibility of him being terminated.136 However, both her supervisors and any 
collegial support for Franchina quickly crumbled when word spread about Fer-
ro’s disciplinary proceeding.137 Firefighters at her station began to treat her with 
“contempt and disdain.”138 Among other incidents, Andy McDougal, a fire-
fighter subordinate to her and the station cook, publicly yelled at her “What are 
you trying to get him fucking fired?”139 Although the top supervisor at her sta-
tion was present, he did not report or reprimand McDougal.140 
 
127  Id. 
128  Id. 
129  Id. 
130  Id. 
131  Id. 
132  Id. at 39–40. 
133  Id. at 40. 
134  Id. 
135  Id. 
136  Id. 
137  Id. 
138  Id. 
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140  Id. 
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Over the next two years, Franchina was subject to a repeated and persistent 
barrage of insults, insubordination, and sabotage—frequently called “bitch, 
cunt or Franchina.”141 On one occasion, McDougal exclaimed loudly in her 
presence “affirmative action’s killing this fucking job.”142 At another time, he 
intentionally shoved Franchina into the wall.143 Again, although she com-
plained, nothing was done.144 
At one point, the men at her station used a white board in a common area 
to taunt her.145  
Twenty-one total insults were written on the board including: . . . “you get 
what you get, bitch,” and “Frangina leads Team Lesbo to victory.” [She] testi-
fied that she personally heard Captain Peter Spedutii, a thirty-year veteran of the 
Department, point at the white board and say, “I’ll show her[,]” . . . [and] him 
brag[ging about the derogatory comments that were] written on the board. Alt-
hough Franchina complained to [Superior] Chief Michael Crawford, . . . the 
perpetrators were not reprimanded . . . and [the insulting remarks] remained up 
over 14 hours.146 
Thus, Franchina is the story of a highly qualified performer, relatively ear-
ly in her career, who experiences much bullying because of her gender and per-
ceived sexual orientation. She has no work problems until the homogeneous 
and male-dominated culture is threatened. Egregious and vulgar harassment by 
one misogynist firefighter and concerns about his welfare quickly inspire others 
to also harass her.147 As a way to defend their culture and masculine solidarity, 
her male colleagues collectively turn on her. Their insults and abusive actions 
are demeaning, gendered and sexually-insulting. Her sexual orientation makes 
her more vulnerable to their tactics. 
Even after Franchina repeatedly complains, her all-male supervisors and 
the institutional structure fail her. She is alone, with no way to address the 
power disparity that female firefighters face. Her male supervisors exercise 
their power and discretion in ways that minimize or ignore her harassment in 
the interest of traditional male cohesiveness. 
In summary, while many continue to believe the myth that sexual harass-
ment is no longer prevalent, overwhelming evidence indicates otherwise. Fur-
thermore, a related faulty belief is that sex discrimination and sexual harass-
ment are really two different phenomena.148 However, as work by Shultz and 
others reveal, and cases such as the Franchina case graphically illustrate, sex 
 
141  Id. at 40–41. 
142  Id. at 41. 
143  Id. 
144  Id. 
145  Id. at 40–41. 
146  Id.  
147  Id. 
148  See discussion in supra Section II.A. 
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discrimination and sexual harassment have a common motivation of demeaning 
and dominating women.149 
III. MYTH: SEXUAL HARASSERS ARE STOPPED AND PUNISHED 
We would like to think that even if sexual harassment does occur from 
time to time, it is quickly and appropriately dealt with: Harassers are identified, 
employers and the harasser are held responsible, and the harasser is stopped 
and punished. The unfortunate reality is different. The formal processes for re-
solving these disputes all too often do not result in alleged harassers being pub-
licly identified, in employers being held accountable, or in harassers being pun-
ished. 
As we discuss below, the dispute resolution process is problematic from 
the beginning: Faced with a system stacked against them, victims are often si-
lent about the harassment. And even those who decide to formally complain 
face either a litigation process that is ineffective at addressing harassment or an 
unwanted arbitration process in which they are systematically disadvantaged. 
Not surprising then, in both litigation and arbitration, the outcomes greatly fa-
vor the employer and often the alleged harasser is not stopped or punished. 
A. Victims Do Not Report Harassment 
In recent years, the media has reported numerous women’s public com-
plaints about workplace sexual harassment and assault.150 Launching a much-
publicized me-too movement, these victims broke a barrier of silence.151 But 
these women and their public revelations are the exception rather than the rule. 
Large-scale studies show that employees who believe they have been sex-
ually harassed rarely report what has happened to them.152 Estimates are that 
87–94% do not formally complain.153 It turns out that workplace culture and 
practices deter rather than encourage women from complaining. Due to this 
high number of unreported incidents, statistics on the prevalence of sexual har-
assment are gross underestimates.154 
 
149  See discussion in supra Section II.A. 
150  See, e.g., Amanda Becker, Inside the Lincoln Project’s ‘Toxic’ Workplace: Accusations 
of Sexual Harassment and a Culture of Infighting, USA TODAY (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www 
.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2021/02/15/inside-lincoln-project-claims-harassment-sexi 
sm-toxic-workplace/4483922001/ [perma.cc/S4A5-9MBH]. 
151  Jessica Bennett, The #MeToo Moment, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/series/met 
oo-moment [perma.cc/2PRM-L87D] (a database the New York Times continuously updates 
with #MeToo stories). 
152  See FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88, at 3; MCKINSEY REPORT 2018, supra note 29, at 
22; Deborah L. Brake, Coworker Retaliation in the #MeToo Era, 49 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 50 
(2019) [hereinafter Brake, Coworkers]; Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 
25 (2005) [hereinafter Brake, Retaliation]. 
153  See FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88, at 7; Brake, Coworkers, supra note 152, at 50. 
154  See FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88, at 7. 
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Why does this happen? Research indicates that employee silence is 
prompted by the following.155 First, there are victims’ personal and social 
costs.156 An essential step toward reporting harassment is victim’s acknowl-
edgement that it has happened.157 But often victims rationalize what occurs, re-
sulting in their denial of the harassment: “Perhaps it was a misunderstanding.” 
“He wouldn’t do that.” “I can trust his intentions.”158 Those who have been 
harassed do not want to see themselves as “victims” of sexual harassment.159 
Doing so forces them to acknowledge their vulnerability and loss of control. It 
also threatens their beliefs in a just and meritocratic society which they formal-
ly believed. Employees also hesitate to complain to others because they fear 
being socially ostracized.160 They worry about what coworkers and bosses will 
think of them.161 
Second, victims have concerns about their employers’ reactions.162 Work-
ers fear employers’ retaliation if they complain.163 They are concerned that em-
ployers will either blame them for what has occurred, or consider their com-
plaint so disruptive to the workplace that they want the complaining employee 
removed.164 In addition, victims fear that the employer will do nothing, perhaps 
not even further investigate.165 Given this, asking employees to formally com-
plain is asking them to take risks with a high likelihood of no meaningful im-
provement in their situation. Knowing that victims are unlikely to report inci-
dents, harassers may well continue harassment, knowing that there are no 
negative consequences.166 Employers’ inaction effectively normalizes the har-
assers’ misconduct. 
Finally, victims question their legal protection.167 They hesitate to report 
harassment because they do not know if they can successfully sue the harasser 
and employer, and whether there is adequate legal protection against employer 
retaliation.168 They may have heard that sexual harassment laws are not particu-
larly effective, and of course, the costs and distress of litigation are daunting.169  
 
155  Id. at 3; Brake, Coworkers, supra note 152, at 50–51. 
156  FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88, at 3; Brake, Coworkers, supra note 152, at 50–51. 
157  Brake, Retaliation, supra note 152, at 26. 
158  Id. 
159  Id. at 26. 
160  Id. at 28, 32, 34. 
161  Id. at 32, 34. 
162  Id. at 36–37; FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88, at 3. 
163  FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88, at 3. 
164  Id. 
165  Id. 
166  Id. at 17. 
167  Brake, Coworkers, supra note 152, at 33, 53. 
168  Id. at 33, 37, 53. 
169  Id at 53. 
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Unfortunately, it turns out that these employee hesitations and fears are 
well-founded.170 Co-workers, particularly men, tend to blame those who claim 
to be victims of discrimination.171 They are labeled as whiners and criticized for 
disrupting the perceived workplace harmony.172 And as indicated by many law-
suits, employers do sometimes retaliate.173 Particularly if the alleged harasser is 
a star performer, employers may do nothing to ameliorate the situation.174 Or 
they may even shift the burden to the harassed employee by removing them in-
voluntarily, either by changing their job or by finding an excuse for firing 
them.175 And as discussed later, the victims’ concern about the lack of legal 
protection is also justified.176 The law does not provide a reliable safety net, ei-
ther for sexual harassment or for retaliation. Plaintiffs in sexual harassment liti-
gation have a very poor success rate.177 
Plus, the well-established at-will employment doctrine confirms that em-
ployers are in control of an employee’s job security.178 As a strong presumptive 
general rule, employers can fire an employee at its will, without notice and for 
any reason.179 Except for narrowly defined public policy and statutory and con-
tractual exceptions, the “at-will doctrine” prioritizes employers’ autonomy and 
discretion over employers’ right to their jobs.180 
Bystanders of harassment are similarly silent. The McKinsey Report found 
that one in four employees “sometimes or very often saw biased behavior to-
ward women.”181 But of this group of bystanders, only a third objected.182 By-
 
170  FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88, at 10; Brake, Coworkers, supra note 152, at 1–2, 10 
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WOMEN Q. 11 (2020). 
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standers fear the risks of hurting their careers and their social standing in the 
workplace.183 At the same time, they also question whether their calling out the 
harassment will make a difference.184 This lack of confidence in employers’ re-
sponsiveness is born out, given that half of the employees who objected say 
nothing happened as a result.185 Their fear of hurting their careers is also a le-
gitimate concern, given the limited protection under employment law for 
“whistle-blowers” and under retaliation claims.186 
B. Litigation and the Victims’ Dismal Prospects 
Even if aggrieved employees take the very difficult step of formally com-
plaining, there is little assurance that the harassment will be recognized and that 
the perpetrator is stopped and punished. The employee’s complaint is predicta-
bly met with the employer’s and alleged harasser’s denials, so the parties’ dis-
pute must be resolved. The employee’s alternative formal paths are litigation or 
arbitration. As shown in the following illustration and subsequently discussed, 
both paths offer plaintiffs’ dismal outcomes.187 
ILLUSTRATION. FEW HARASSERS AND EMPLOYERS ARE IDENTIFIED AND PUNISHED 
THROUGH LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 
Out of 100 alleged harassments, only 15 victims formally complain— 
-> If these 15 go to litigation, in only 4 cases do plaintiffs succeed, which is only 4% of 
100 alleged harassments 
-> If these 15 go to arbitration, in only 2 cases do complainants succeed, which is only 
2% of 100 alleged harassments 
 
On one hand, litigation offers the opportunity to resolve this particular dis-
pute, but it also serves collateral purposes. Litigation is a public process, so the 
alleged harasser and an employer’s inadequate response are made known. And 
public identification could potentially prevent others from harm from particular 
harasser, especially if the court holds for the plaintiff. Other potential harassers 
will also be more hesitant to harass given the plight of the harasser in this case. 
 
183  Id. 
184  Id. 
185  Id. 
186  Brake, Retaliation, supra note 152, at 36–37. 
187  Settlement and informal internal grievance procedures (such as counseling, ombudsper-
son, etc.) are also possible. Data on these procedures, however, are very difficult to ascertain 
and not systematically reported, as far as the author is aware. Our discussion here, therefore, 
focuses on the formal procedures of litigation and arbitration. The illustration is based on 
data provided in FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88 (indicating an estimated 85% of those 
harassed do not formally complain), and Pat K. Chew, Comparing the Effects of Judges’ 
Gender and Arbitrators’ Gender in Sex Discrimination Cases and Why It Matters, 32 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 195, 207 (2017) (using data on complainants’ success rate in litigation 
and arbitration, indicating that 27% (plaintiff success rate) of 15 = 4.05 and 14% (complain-
ants’ success rate) of 15 = 2.1). 
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Even if the plaintiff is not successful, the public revelation of her allegations 
may provide a cautionary tale of potential employer and harasser liabilities. The 
litigation system also has due process safeguards that help plaintiffs access in-
formation they need to build their case. 
On the other hand, those employees that bring sexual harassment lawsuits 
face an uphill battle. Ultimately, they will most likely lose. Empirical evidence 
indicates that plaintiffs in federal courts are successful in only about 25% of the 
cases.188 Why these dismal prospects for holding employers and harassers re-
sponsible? There are at least two explanations: first is that the law is ineffective 
in stopping sexual harassment; and second is that judges as a whole find it dif-
ficult to identify and therefore fully understand the victim’s workplace predic-
ament. 
Scholars and practitioners have extensively critiqued the law, explaining 
why it has been so ineffective in stopping sexual harassment.189 While the Su-
preme Court case of Harris v. Forklift heralded the landmark extension of Title 
VII sex discrimination protection to sexual harassment in 1993,190 sexual har-
assment jurisprudence has since evolved in ways that narrow rather than ex-
pand possible protections against sexual harassment. The legal standards for 
proving sexual harassment, for instance, that the harassment must be “pervasive 
or severe” and that the harassment must be attributed to the plaintiff’s sex, have 
been interpreted as so demanding that fact patterns satisfying those standards 
tend to be very limited.191 For instance, while many courts recognize explicit 
forms of harassment, the more common and pervasive subtle forms of harass-
ment confirmed by social scientists192 are not acknowledged. At the same time, 
the law provides employers with a convenient affirmative defense of providing 
a “reasonable” grievance procedure—without appreciating the psychological 
and practical difficulties for an employee to actually use those procedures.193 In 
short, the legal net for catching sexual harassment is too small to effectively 
address all the sexual harassment that actually occurs in the workplace. 
In addition, the gender composition of judges also affects the outcomes of 
sexual harassment cases. Research consistently shows that male judges are less 
likely than female judges to hold for plaintiffs, who are typically female, in sex 
discrimination and sexual harassment cases (called the “gender effect”).194 Jen-
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nifer Peresie, for instance, found that male judges hold for the plaintiffs only 
24% of the time; female judges hold for the plaintiffs 39% of the time.195 Pre-
sumably, female judges are better able to understand the nuances of sexual har-
assment in the workplace such as more subtle forms of harassment.196 At the 
same time, 87.8% of federal judges are male and only 12.2% are female.197 
Given this dominance of men as judges, plus the very high standards for estab-
lishing sexual harassment under the law, it is no wonder that harassed women 
cannot rely on litigation to punish their harassers and their employers. 
C. Arbitration and Victims’ Even More Dismal Outcomes 
As discussed above, employees’ prospects for a favorable resolution in liti-
gation are not promising. But the litigation process at least allows the public 
discourse on the alleged harasser, the actions on which the plaintiff bases her or 
his complaint, and the employer’s actions or lack of actions.198 The litigation 
process also has the procedural protections of due process guaranteed by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and the right to an appellate review 
on the merits. And in approximately a quarter of cases, the employer and al-
leged harasser are held accountable to some extent.199 
In contrast, mandatory employment arbitration characteristically does not 
have any of these attributes.200 The arbitration process is private and confiden-
tial, so the allegations are not public.201 FRCP are not mandated, and there is no 
judicial review on the merits. Instead of judges selected through a public vet-
ting process, arbitrators privately selected by the parties determine the outcome. 
Not surprisingly, while plaintiffs face dismal odds in litigation, preliminary re-
search indicates that the prospects for success in arbitration are even worse—in 
only 14% of the cases are the employer and alleged harasser held accounta-
ble.202 
Yet employers increasingly use mandatory employment arbitration to re-
solve harassment claims. As Jean Sternlight observes, once the Supreme Court 
gave the green light to employment arbitration in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
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Lane Corp.,203 companies quickly gravitated toward it.204 In many work settings 
today, mandatory employment arbitration is typically part of the employment 
agreement between employers and its workers.205 This excerpt from a typical 
provision in an employment agreement illustrates: 
      In consideration of my employment with this company and its promise to ar-
bitrate all disputes, I agree that . . . any and all past, present, or future controver-
sies, claims, or disputes between the company . . . and me, including but not lim-
ited to any disputes arising from my employment or termination of my 
employment (“Disputes”) will be subject to binding arbitration under the Federal 
Arbitration Act. 
      Disputes include, but are not limited to, any federal or state statutory claim, 
including but not limited to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and all oth-
er civil rights statutes, claims of retaliation, harassment, discrimination, or 
wrongful termination, and any other contractual, tort, or statutory claims to the 
extent allowed by law. 
      I understand that, except as provided below, the company and I waive any 
right to a judge or jury trial on any Dispute. 206 
Particularly pertinent for our discussion, the contract language requires 
employers to use arbitration instead of litigation for their sexual harassment 
complaints. In addition, all kinds of other disputes are covered, extending to all 
kinds of employee complaints about discrimination, privacy, loyalty, and com-
petition. From the employer’s point of view, the broader the scope the better. 
And as discussed below, it exemplifies employers’ advantage over employees 
at every stage of the arbitration process—from the design of the process itself 
to the selection of the arbitrators. 
1. Employer-Drafted Terms 
Employment arbitration is attractive to employers for many reasons, in-
cluding their higher likelihood of success and their assumption that arbitration 
has lower costs and is a speedier process than litigation.207 Another primary at-
traction is that it is a confidential and private way to deal with employees’ 
complaints of harassment, thus helping employers keep these disputes and any 
possible negative reputational harm under wraps.208 The employee’s complaint 
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207  KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, THE ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC: 
MANDATORY ARBITRATION DEPRIVES WORKERS AND CONSUMERS OF THEIR RIGHTS 18–19 
(2015) [hereinafter THE ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC].  
208  Reputational concerns can be both internal (e.g., harm to workplace morale and company 
loyalty; providing incentives for other employees to complain) and external (e.g., harm to 
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and the arbitrator’s decision is not known to any external third parties, includ-
ing customers, competitors, and journalists. The arbitrations, including the em-
ployees’ arguments and employers’ defenses are behind closed doors. Thus, 
companies can keep discrete employees’ detailed complaints of a supervisor’s 
inappropriate conduct and possible management cover-up from other employ-
ees internally as well as third parties externally.209 
Courts allow the employer to treat employment arbitration agreements as 
an enforceable privately negotiated contract.210 As with any contracts, which 
are not inherently unfair, contracts providing for arbitration are not inherently 
unfair.211 The typical contract providing for employment arbitration, however, 
tends to have terms more advantageous to employers since they are drafted by 
employers’ lawyers and with the employer’s interest in mind. Employers’ law-
yers intentionally and understandably draft them in their clients’ own interest to 
assure maximum confidentiality and maximum management control.212 
Employees, while theoretically able to negotiate terms more protective of 
their interests, are in reality offered these completed agreements as a condition 
of employment. It is the rare case where prospective employees take the risks 
or have the leverage to push back on the terms of the standardized provisions 
typically embedded in the general employment agreement. Instead, new em-
ployees feel that the general employment agreement including the terms on ar-
bitration are “take it or leave it”, with the “leave it” option tantamount to turn-
ing down the employment opportunity.213 In this way, these arbitration 
agreements are a condition of employment. 
Increasingly, employers are using these arbitration agreements and agree-
ments obligating the parties to keep confidential the dispute and its resolution 
in non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) in combination to doubly assure that al-
legations of sexual harassment and the resolution of claims stay secret.214 As 
Maureen Weston points out, this means that sexual harassers go unreported and 
possibly unpunished, resulting in ongoing public safety risks.215 Even if arbitra-
tors conclude harassment has occurred, their companies may still allow har-
assers to continue their jobs because, for instance, they are outstanding revenue 
producers for their companies—thus allowing the perpetrators to harass again 
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within the company.216 Even if the harassers are fired from one job for their 
misconduct, they can go on to other jobs in other places and continue their har-
assment in the new setting—protected by the secrecy of the arbitration proceed-
ings as required in the arbitration agreement and an NDA.217 
2. Arbitration Procedures Favor Employers 
As drafters of the arbitration agreement, employers understandably design 
an arbitration process with procedures that are as efficient, inexpensive, and 
convenient for them as possible. Unlike litigation, the FRCP or comparable 
state due process rules are not required in arbitration. While the arbitration 
agreement may refer to or incorporate the rules of a private arbitral administra-
tors, such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA) or JAMS Mediation, 
Arbitration and ADR Services, these rules are much less comprehensive than 
the FRCP.218 
The differences between the procedural rules that employers draft and the 
FRCP are understandable given that the FRCP priority is to assure the fullest 
fairest process for resolving disputes,219 while employers prioritize their effi-
ciency goals over comprehensive due process. Thus, arbitration procedures in 
the arbitration agreement are predictably less protective of an employee’s due 
process than the protection afforded under the FRCP. 
What is the consequence? A consideration of the FRCP rules on discovery 
illustrate. While FRCP rules have many purposes, one important goal is proce-
dures that help assure relevant, reliable, and fair disclosure.220 According to the 
FRCP, “[t]hrough discovery, the parties find out what the other side’s claims or 
defenses are really all about and what facts they are based upon.”221 Each party 
can use five discovery tools: depositions, interrogatories, requests for produc-
tion, medical examinations if the court grants a party’s motion, and requests for 
admissions. 222 And there are required disclosures between the parties: identify-
ing each person “likely to have discoverable information . . . the . . . party may 
use to support its claims or defenses, [identifying all documents or objects in 
control of each party]”223 that she may use to support her claims or defenses, 
plaintiff’s assessment and proof of damages, and defendant’s insurance agree-
ments. With a “watchful eye,” the court oversees compliance with discovery 
 
216  FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88, at 13. 
217  Weston, supra note 198, at 512–13; 523–25 (including examples). 
218  Id. at 9 (commenting on institutional rules). 
219  RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 7–11 (3d ed. 2017). For discussions of full and fair 
dispute resolution processes, see Sternlight, supra note 198, at 1635, 1667. 
220  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (providing a set of rules allowing the parties to request and ex-
change relevant information). 
221  FREER, supra note 219, at 386; see FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
222  See FED. R. CIV. P. 30–36. 
223  Id. 26(a)(1)(A)(i). 
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rules. Unless the court orders otherwise, parties may discover “any nonprivi-
leged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”224 
These discovery rules, however, are not required or are much more limited 
than discovery procedures in litigation.225 In an employment case, the employ-
er’s actions and records may contain critical information for supporting the 
employee’s claims that would be very difficult for the aggrieved employee to 
obtain in the absence of mandated discovery rules. Thus, the scope of an em-
ployee’s rights to discovery can make a critical difference in the employee’s 
success or failure.226 
In addition to diminished or nonexistent discovery procedures, employers 
also often draft arbitration agreements that do not have other due process rules 
required in litigation. For example, courts are automatically obligated to follow 
legal principles and legal precedents, but arbitrators are not.227 The arbitration 
agreement provides the basis of the arbitrator’s decision-making. While the 
agreement can specify legal principles and precedents, it is not unusual for it to 
provide for an alternative basis—such as industry standards, fairness, or strict 
compliance with any “contract” terms. In the absence of any specified basis for 
decision-making, the arbitrators are presumptively left to use their own discre-
tion. 
Another example is the appeals process built into the litigation system. In 
the interest of efficiency, arbitration agreements routinely provide that the arbi-
trator’s decision is not subject to any judicial review or appeal.228 Consistent 
with the typical terms of the arbitration agreement, the arbitrator’s decision is 
“final and binding.”229 There is no further review on the merits; the employ-
ees’ “day in arbitration” is over and there is no “day in court.” 
3. Arbitrators Inclined Toward Employer Perspective 
Employees are further disadvantaged in arbitration because of the arbitra-
tors themselves. There is increasing evidence that arbitrators in employment 
cases are inclined toward the employers’ perspective. This occurs primarily be-
cause of the employers’ advantage as “repeat players” in selecting arbitrators 
 
224  Id. 26(b)(1). 
225  See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 198, at 1641 n.51 (noting limited discovery in arbitra-
tion); see also infra Appendix (providing a sample arbitration agreement which shows no 
specific provisions for discovery). The agreement may designate arbitral institution’s rules, 
as indicated in Provision 5, but these rules typically provide only very general discovery 
rules. Id. 
226  See Sternlight, supra note 198, at 1641 n.51. 
227  Agreements to arbitrate are considered contractual agreements subject to the agreed-upon 
terms. As illustrated in Appendix, infra, if it does not specify that legal precedents will gov-
ern the dispute’s resolution, then the arbitrators are not required to follow legal precedents. 
228  Id. 
229  Id. 
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from a pool of eager arbitrators.230 In addition, arbitrators are disproportionately 
males and are thus less likely to intuitively identify with the plaintiffs’ predic-
aments given that plaintiffs are most often female.231 
In theory, both employers and employees select the arbitrator. But in prac-
tice, employers have advantages in selecting the arbitrator. As repeat players, 
they have more experience with the arbitration process and are more knowl-
edgeable about prospective arbitrators and their reputations. Employers under-
standably select arbitrators that are receptive to the management perspective.232 
Andrea Cann Chandrasekhar and David Horton confirm this employer’s 
advantage in consumer arbitration.233 They note that “even controlling for other 
factors, companies that arbitrate more than once boast higher win rates than 
one-shot firms.”234 Similarly, Alexander Colvin and Mark Gough investigated 
2,802 employment arbitration cases administered over an 11-year period by the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA), looking for predictors of employee 
wins and damage amounts in an award.235 They found that larger-scale employ-
ers who are involved in more arbitration cases tend to have higher win rates and 
have lower damage awards made against them.236 Their study also provides ev-
idence of a significant repeat employer-arbitrator pair effect: employers that use 
the same arbitrator on multiple occasions win more often and have lower dam-
ages awarded against them than do employers appearing before an arbitrator for 
the first time.237 
In addition, arbitrators as a professional group are already attuned to the 
employers’ perspective. Judges are the decisionmakers in litigation, and arbitra-
tors are the decisionmakers in arbitration. However, unlike judges, arbitrators 
 
230  Alexander J.S. Colvin & Mark D. Gough, Individual Employment Rights Arbitration in 
the United States: Actors and Outcomes, 68 ILR REV. 1019, 1035–40 (2015); Alexander J.S. 
Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 21 (2011).  
231  See supra text accompanying notes 194-97 (drawing from research on judges’ gender). 
232  See Chew, supra note 187, at 210 (describing how parties select arbitrators). 
233  See Andrea Cann Chandrasekher & David Horton, Empirically Investigating the Source 
of the Repeat Player Effect in Consumer Arbitration 1 (Oct. 22, 2019) (unpublished manu-
script), https://law-economic-studies.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/Chand 
rasekher_Arbitration_10_22_19.pdf [perma.cc/43EY-2VC8]. These researchers further ex-
plore whether this “repeat player effect is a product of experience within the arbitral forum 
(the ‘experience’ hypothesis),” as suggested here, or “characteristics of the repeat playing 
companies themselves (the ‘defendant-specific’ hypothesis).” Id. “Using a unique regression 
specification that includes both discrete and continuous random variables . . . [to study] 
4,570 consumer arbitration awards from the American Arbitration Association, . . . they find 
that the repeat player effect is more consistent with the defendant-specific hypothesis than it 
is with the experience hypothesis.” Id.; see also Sternlight, supra note 198, at 1649–50. 
234  Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 233. 
235  Colvin & Gough, supra note 230, at 1019. 
236  Id. (“The authors find that self-represented employees tend to settle cases less often, win 
cases that proceed to a hearing less often, and receive lower damage awards.”). 
237  Id.; Chew, supra note 187, at 207. 
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have to compete for business.238 Arbitrators, recognizing employers as repeat 
players, understand that they are an important target market. They need em-
ployers to find them acceptable as arbitrators, and therefore want a reputation 
as being receptive to the employer’s perspective. These market pressures shape 
the pool of arbitrators, so that only the ones acceptable to employers stay in 
business. These market dynamics tend to favor employers. 
As suggested above, arbitrators as a group are already inclined toward em-
ployer perspectives. In addition, arbitrators are also a homogenous group, most 
likely to be white males.239 Employees in harassment disputes are from diverse 
gender and racial backgrounds. They are more likely to be women in sexual 
harassment and sex discrimination claims. Minority employees, particularly 
Blacks, are the most frequent plaintiffs in racial harassment and discrimination 
claims.240 Drawing from the research on the effect of judges’ gender in sexual 
harassment litigation,241 it would predict that male arbitrators in sexual harass-
ment arbitration cases are less likely to hold for employees than female arbitra-
tors.242 This supposedly occurs because female arbitrators are better able to un-
derstand female employees’ situation, while male arbitrators would find it more 
difficult to identify with female worker’s experiences of sexual harassment.243 
CONCLUSION 
IV.    MYTHS AND REALITIES 
Three interconnected myths help us rationalize and minimize sexual har-
assment in the workplace: (1) sex discrimination is no longer prevalent; (2) 
sexual harassment is no longer pervasive; and (3) in the unlikely event there is 
sexual harassment, the harassment is stopped and the harasser is punished. As 
this Article explains, the unfortunate reality is often the opposite. 
Sex discrimination is still prevalent in many work settings as evidenced by 
documented pay gaps, underrepresentation that is perpetuated by barriers to ad-
vancement, and disproportionate microaggressions. Ongoing sex discrimination 
is explained in part by entrenched and sometimes unconscious cultural beliefs 
 
238  See Chew, supra note 187, at 210. 
239  See id. at 211, 216. 
240  Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis 
of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1143 (2009). 
241  Chew, supra note 187, at 197–203. 
242  But see Colvin & Gough, supra note 230, at 1019, 1023 (“Female arbitrators and experi-
enced professional labor arbitrators render awards in favor of employees less often than do 
male arbitrators and other arbitrators.”). 
243  The author’s research, however, suggests that this gender effect in arbitration is more ten-
tative and complicated by the market dynamics described above. Research findings suggest 
that the pro-employer inclinations, prompted by the market forces described above, trump 
over the general tendency for female decision-makers to more intuitively understand sexual 
harassment and be more disposed toward female complainants. Chew, supra note 187, at 
202–03, 211. 
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about the ideal roles of men and women in relationship to the workplace. In ad-
dition, we rationalize problems by the mistaken beliefs that progress is “just a 
matter of time” and that progress is actually in women’s control. 
Contrary to the second myth that sexual harassment is no longer a problem, 
sexual harassment in its many forms is pervasive in many settings. This reality 
is not surprising given that sex discrimination and sexual harassment have a 
common basis: protection of men’s dominance in certain industries and jobs by 
controlling, demeaning, and insulting women who threaten male turf. As Vicki 
Shultz and other scholars observe, sexual harassment is more about sexism than 
sexual desire.244 
The third myth is that when sexual harassment occurs, the harassers and 
their employers are stopped and punished. All too often, this does not happen. 
The processes for formally resolving these sexual harassment disputes are often 
fraught with frustrations and failure for victims of sexual harassment. First of 
all, the workplace culture discourages victims from reporting. Plaintiffs who 
move ahead with litigation confront laws and precedents that create exceeding-
ly high evidentiary burdens and judges who do not intuitively appreciate their 
perspectives. Pursuant to their employment agreements, many employees do 
not even have the option of suing. Thus, many victims are forced into employ-
ment arbitration where the odds are even more stacked against them. Employ-
ers have numerous advantages in arbitration, including their design of the arbi-
tration process and other substantiated “repeat player” benefits. Arbitrators also 
have market pressures to be receptive to employers’ and alleged harassers’ ar-
gument. As Jean Sternlight and Maureen Weston observe: mandatory employ-
ment arbitration and nondisclosure agreements result in too many harassers get-
ting away with harassment.245 
V.  PROPOSALS 
A comprehensive plan to dismantle these myths and provide solutions to 
sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and employment arbitration goes well 
beyond the purpose of this Article.246 However, a few curated proposals on sex 
discrimination, sexual harassment, and employment arbitration are offered to 
get us thinking about what we can do. 
A. Proposal for Sex Discrimination: Fixing the Broken Rung 
In our discussion of ongoing sex discrimination, the problem of the “bro-
ken rung” in the promotion ladder is highlighted. As the McKinsey Report re-
veals in their study, for every 100 men promoted, only 72 women are promot-
 
244  Schultz 1998, supra note 98, at 1755. 
245  See Sternlight, supra note 198, at 1664; Weston, supra note 198, at 522–23. 
246  See FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88, at 66–71 (offering more comprehensive plan for 
addressing sexual harassment). 
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ed.247 This gender disparity obviously affects the specific women who are not 
promoted, but this broken rung also has longer term broader future effects. Re-
ducing the number of women who enter that initial step in the management 
ladder decreases the pool in every subsequent stage (e.g., senior manag-
er/director, vice-president, senior vice-president, and C-suite leaders) of the 
pipeline thereafter. “[U]nless we close the disparities in hiring and promotions 
that make up the broken rung, we are many decades away from reaching parity, 
if we reach it at all.”248 
FIVE STEPS FOR FIXING THE BROKEN RUNG:249 
--Set goals.  
Rather than aspiring in general terms, employers can set specific and bold targets for 
representation of women at the first-level of management. By publicizing these goals, 
employers would be held accountable and garner support for these goals.  
--Require diverse slates for hiring and promotions.  
Increasing the number of diverse candidates for hiring and promotions can notably in-
crease the probability of a woman getting the position. Sincere and committed efforts to 
find well-qualified candidates is important. 
--Evaluators should have unconscious bias training.  
Employers are becoming increasingly aware of the effects of unconscious bias in em-
ployment decisions—triggering unfair and gendered assumptions about the future po-
tential of certain candidates. Training in unconscious bias appears to make a positive 
difference in companies making progress. 
--Establish clear evaluation criteria.  
Employers should have in place the evaluation criteria before the review process begins. 
Evaluation tools should be based on objective and measurable input reflective of the 
evaluation criteria. Candidates should have a safe way to disclose their impressions of 
potential bias.  
--Put more women in line.  
Employers should be sure women have access to opportunities that put them in line for 
management. This includes leadership training, sponsorship, and high-profile assign-
ments.  
B. Proposal for Sexual Harassment: Bystander Intervention 
In our discussion of ongoing sexual harassment, we note the possible role 
of others in intervening in harassment or supporting those who do complain. 
Workplace leaders and colleagues at all levels can identify and help stop har-
assment—thus helping to change the norms for what is acceptable and respect-
ful conduct. But as we discussed, bystander intervention is currently the excep-
tion rather than the rule.250 How do we change that? 
 
247  MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 11. 
248  Id. at 12. 
249  Id. at 16–17. 
250  Supra Part IV.  
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There is encouraging evidence that training programs in bystander inter-
vention can be successful. In a macro-review of research on the topic, Gabriel 
Mujal and his co-researchers found that training programs used in university 
and college settings have been effective in changing bystanders’ attitudes and 
conduct.251 Through a series of steps, participants become more aware of the 
problems and learn how to take responsibility to solve them.252 Two particular 
training programs, “Bringing in the Bystander” and the “The Men’s Program,” 
have the most consistent effectiveness.253 
While more widely used in university and college settings for sexual as-
saults, the promotion and training for bystander intervention in sexual harass-
ment is slowly being utilized in the workplace.254 Two states, New York and 
Connecticut, have recently incorporated bystander training into their sexual 
harassment laws for employers.255 Lauren Daley and her coauthors for Catalyst 
(a gender-equity in the workplace organization) describe bystander intervention 
training of employees.256 It should include the following training and practice: 
recognizing when they may feel reluctant to intervene (barriers), when to inter-
vene, what behaviors to intervene on (defining sexual harassment), and how to 
 
251  Gabriela Mujal et al., A Systematic Review of Bystander Interventions for the Prevention 
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er Training, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 31, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/10/to-combat-
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intervene.257 Steps in “how to intervene” (sometimes called the 4 Ds +) include 
how to directly confront the situation (direct), how to create a distraction (dis-
tract), how to get help (delegate), how to touch base with the target later (de-
lay), and how to report.258 
Effective training of course has to be part of a broader workplace culture 
where management clearly endorses and is committed to a workplace of civility 
and mutual respect among all employees, regardless of their gender. Manage-
ment should create “a culture of accountability free from retaliation” for those 
who complain about and intervene in sexual harassment.259 
C. Proposal for Employment Arbitrations: Recalibrating the Power 
Finally, we recall our discussion of the frustrating and ineffective alterna-
tives for those who have been harassed and want to do something to stop and 
punish the harasser. Among other topics, we explored the lop-sided advantages 
of employers over complaining employees in the arbitration process. How can 
we recalibrate the parties’ relative positions so that there is a fairer playing 
field? By doing so, we improve the efficacy of identifying and stopping har-
assment in the workplace, instead of harassers slipping through without any re-
percussions. 
One way to fundamentally change the current situation is to no longer 
make arbitration mandatory, but instead to return the presumptive power of 
employees’ choice of litigation or arbitration to employees. At the very least, 
this would encourage employers to offer arbitration provisions that would be 
more attractive to employees. For instance, the proposed provision could assure 
more discovery of relevant materials. Employees could also be assured of more 
of a voice in the selection of arbitrators and more gender-diverse arbitrators 
from which to select. 
However, there are currently few examples of recalibrating the employers’ 
power to require mandatory employment arbitration. One example was prompt-
ed by the unusual leverage of a group of very desirable job applicants; the sec-
ond was instituted by state law. In the first example, it was brought to the atten-
tion of Harvard Law students interviewing at a well-known West Coast law 
firm for summer associate positions, that the firm would require them to sign a 
mandatory arbitration agreement.260 This agreement would require them to go 
 
257  Id. at 9; see also Schulte, supra note 254. 
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to arbitration for an array of employee claims, including sexual harassment 
claims. Unlike many other law students, Harvard Law students enjoy the privi-
lege of firms competing over them.261 Exercising their very real competitive 
leverage, they made public their objection to this firm’s mandatory arbitration 
requirement and prompted attention to other firms’ similar practice.262 This 
West Coast law firm consequently changed their policy so that their employees 
(including their summer associates) would not be forced into arbitration to re-
solve their sexual harassment complaints.263 
The second example is not dependent on the leverage of highly-desirable 
job applicants, but instead more inclusively protects all job applicants and em-
ployees in California.264 Under a new state law, an employer cannot require any 
applicant for employment or any employee to “waive any right, forum, or pro-
cedure for a violation of any provision of the California Fair Employment and 
Housing Act (FEHA) or other specific statutes governing employment as a 
condition of employment. . . . This bill would additionally make violations of 
the prohibitions described above, relating to the waiver of rights, forums, or 
procedures, unlawful employment practices under FEHA.”265 In other words, 
employers cannot require job applicants or employees to resolve state-based 
discrimination and labor code claims in arbitration. This would include sexual 
harassment claims made under state law. Furthermore, employers face legal 
consequences for threatening, retaliating, or discriminating against any worker 
who refuses to waive their rights to litigation. 
In conclusion, the challenges in transforming our workplace into a produc-
tive environment free of gender disparities and sexual harassment are daunting. 
The challenges to assuring that litigation and arbitration are effective ways to 
stop sexual harassment are difficult. Hiding from our current predicament is no 
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21 NEV. L.J. 1223 
1260 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:3 
 
APPENDIX: SAMPLE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT PROVISIONS (COMPOSITE FROM 
VARIOUS AGREEMENTS) 
In consideration of my employment with this company and its promise to 
arbitrate all disputes, I agree that, except as provided below, any and all past, 
present, or future controversies, claims, or disputes between the company (or 
any director, officer, agent, shareholder, employee) and me, including but not 
limited to any disputes arising from my employment or termination of my em-
ployment (“Disputes”) will be subject to binding arbitration under the Federal 
Arbitration Act.  
Disputes include, but are not limited to, any federal or state statutory claim, 
including but not limited to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and all 
other civil rights statutes, claims of retaliation, harassment, discrimination, or 
wrongful termination, and any other contractual, tort, or statutory claims to the 
extent allowed by law.  
I understand that, except as provided below, the company and I waive any 
right to a judge or jury trial on any Dispute.  
The arbitrator, and not any government court or agency, shall have exclu-
sive authority to resolve any Dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, 
enforceability, voidability, or formation of this arbitration provision;  
Arbitration Procedure. The Company and I agree that any arbitration will 
be administered by [an arbitral institution such as the American Arbitration As-
socitaion] pursuant to its employee arbitration rules and procedures.  
The arbitrator will have the power to decide motions prior to any arbitra-
tion hearing, the power to award any individual remedies available under appli-
cable law including injunctive relief.  
The arbitrator will apply the substantive law of the state in which the claim 
arose, or federal law, or both, as applicable. The federal rules of evidence will 
apply. The arbitrator will not have the authority to disregard or refuse to en-
force any lawful company policy, not will require the company to adopt a poli-
cy not otherwise required by law.  
The parties will each bear their own costs and fees, except that the arbitra-
tor can apply cost and fee-shifting to the benefit of the prevailing party.  
The arbitrator’s decision will be in writing and contain findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. The arbitrator’s award may be entered as a final and bind-
ing judgment in any court having jurisdiction thereof.  
Except as provided by law, the rules of the arbitral instituion, or this arbi-
tration provision, arbitration will be the sole, exclusive, and final remedy for 
any dispute between me and the company. 
 
 
 
